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forest cover in developing countries by offering results-based 
payments. The international framework and agreements to 
allow the functioning of this mechanism are being negotiated 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The REDD+ framework adopted by 
the UNFCCC requires each country to fulfil specific steps 
to be eligible for “result-based” funds/payments, and has a 
phased approach: readiness (including capacity building and 
stakeholder consultation), implementation of demonstration 
projects, and results-based payments. This process, which takes 
place at the national scale, is funded and supported by different 
organizations, the most important of which are the UN-REDD 
Programme and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) 
hosted by the World Bank (WB) and steered by an independent 
Committee of Participants (that share responsibility between 
donors and beneficiary countries).
Following the completion of the REDD+ readiness process, 
the UN-REDD and FCPF can disburse funds to participating 
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Abstract
REDD+ (Reducing Emissions, Deforestation and forest Degradation+) is a United Nations Framework Convention 
for Climate Change (UNFCCC) process through which governments reduce the impacts of climate change 
through forest conservation in a results-based payments scheme. Distinct from international negotiations about 
the REDD+ framework under the UNFCCC, there are also REDD+ projects that help governments to set up the 
institutional architecture, plans and strategies to implement REDD+. These capacity-building projects, in the first 
phase of ‘REDD+ readiness’, involve negotiations among national and international actors in which recognition 
and authority claims are used by participants to influence project-level negotiations. This study analyses the project 
development negotiations in a World Bank-led REDD+ capacity building regional project, involving six Central 
African countries between 2008 and 2011. It explores how the project created a ‘negotiation table’ constituted of 
national and regional institutions recognised by the donors and governments, and how this political space, influenced 
by global, regional and national political agendas led to ‘instances’ of recognition and misrecognition – in which 
some negotiating parties’ claims of representation were acknowledge and affirmed, while others’ claims were not. 
Focusing on Cameroon and Gabon, this article analyses how negotiations shaped full participation by Cameroon 
and only partial engagement by Gabon. 
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INTRODUCTION
Central African governments claim to have a common vision 
for forest-related sustainable development. This vision is, in 
part, promoted by the Commission of Central African Forests 
(COMIFAC countries and partners 2011) – an intergovernmental 
body of ten Central African countries. Reducing Emissions, 
Deforestation and Degradation+ (REDD+) is a mechanism for 
reducing global climate change by increasing or maintaining 
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countries that finance the implementation of national 
strategies. In addition, there are many donors supporting the 
REDD+ process in countries by funding capacity-building 
projects, as illustrated by a case in this article. However, as 
each international and regional organization and government 
has its own views of REDD+’s potential impacts on carbon, 
emissions, land tenure, rights, land competition, and economics 
(Fairhead et al 2012; Wily 2012; Anderson and Zerriffi 
2012), they also have different visions about the meaning of 
engagement in REDD+ (Corbera and Schroeder 2011). These 
visions are typically shaped by their existing environmental and 
development policies, as well as by negotiations with donors 
and national consultations about various projects to support 
their entry into REDD+. Governments may use different 
strategies to leverage their agendas in larger political spaces 
(Reyniers 2016).
T h i s  s t u d y  u s e s  t h e  e x a m p l e  o f  a  r e g i o n a l 
REDD+ capacity-building project (referred to hereafter as 
“Project”) to support REDD+ readiness in Central Africa 
to explore how the institutions that international donors and 
country governments choose to recognise as negotiators in a 
project created a ‘negotiation table.’ The Project negotiations 
focused on how funding was allocated at the national and 
regional levels and what activities formed the content of 
the Project. The Project negotiation ‘table’ – a term used by 
several interviewees – can also be seen as a ‘broader political 
space’ in which the participants are recognised as ‘legitimate 
stakeholders’ to debate and engage in the decision-making 
process. In this study it is important to note that the Project 
focal points at the national level were often the same senior 
representatives of their countries at the international climate 
change negotiations. This overlap of roles, including the 
development of the Project during the launching of the 
REDD+ readiness phase in participating Project countries, 
was important in the Project negotiation dynamics. Notably, 
the REDD+ negotiations, as a political space, must include 
‘multiple actors, interests and activities, involving several 
sources of formal and informal power and authority, which 
all influence each other and may or may not coincide in 
their interests and visions’ (Corbera and Shroeder 2011: 90). 
As this case shows, a multiplicity of interests and activities 
were represented through a handful of actors: the Project 
negotiation table was constituted by the World Bank Project 
developers (representing the World Bank), senior members of 
the COMIFAC Secretariat (representing the Central African 
Commission of Ministers of Forests), and Climate Change 
Focal Points (representing their respective environmental or 
forestry ministries). 
Throughout Project negotiations, amidst the strategic 
positioning for financial resources, two types of recognition 
pathways, acceptance and rejection (Assembé unpublished 
manuscript), emerged in particular ‘instances of recognition’ 
(sensu Ferrarese 2009) during the development phase of the 
Project, which involved six Central African states. At the same 
time that this Project was being developed, many other projects 
supporting REDD+ were also being discussed, both regionally 
and nationally. It is likely that the Project dynamics we describe 
here are typical of similar regional projects involving high-
level national representatives and large donors. The cases 
presented in the next sections show diverse perspectives from 
donors, regional and national representatives, with sometimes 
diverging opinions on how successful the Project negotiations 
were. As with any negotiation table, not all proposals will be 
acceptable and concessions must be made; such negotiations, 
especially when viewed in the wider political arena, are 
influenced by power dynamics and political agendas.
The Project development phase was initiated when the six 
project countries requested that the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF) pool their country resources together and set 
up a regional project of 13 million USD. The World Bank 
became the agency that administered the Project funds. After 
initial agreement with participating countries on the Project 
concept, the World Bank drafted a Project document during 
2008-2010, whose content was open to revision through 
further negotiations on Project content between 2010 and 
2011. At the beginning of this development phase, first, the 
government representatives from six Central African countries 
and the World Bank officials agreed upon the general form 
and content of the regional engagement model for REDD+ in 
Central Africa in 2008. Then, the World Bank recognised the 
REDD+ national representatives chosen by their respective 
governments, and set up a process for Project negotiation, 
where national representatives and the World Bank recognised 
COMIFAC as the regional interlocutor and coordinator of the 
Project. 
At the beginning, six COMIFAC countries expressed their 
interest in engaging in the Project: Cameroon, the Central 
African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo. These 
countries comprise the majority of the humid tropical forest 
cover of the Congo River Basin (Marquant et al. 2015). 
However, through the three-year Project development phase 
(2008 to 2011), important differences emerged among the 
participant countries, particularly on how they were engaging 
in REDD+. During this process, while the funds were awarded 
to all six countries, some of these countries decided to access 
the funds, whereas one of them changed their engagement 
with REDD+ and threatened to reject funds that related to a 
portion of the project, only later partially engaging with the 
project (World Bank 2016).
The study looks at two aspects of recognition during 
Project negotiations in which the World Bank played a 
prominent role: (i) choice and recognition of regional and 
national-scale institutions that formed the ‘negotiation table’; 
(ii) misrecognition of decision-making powers of some 
of the national institutions. The decision-making power 
over Project content, the ultimate financial accountability, 
liability and distribution of finances became central arenas 
where the ‘recognition struggle’ took place. Some country 
representatives like those from Gabon expected and demanded 
more decision-making power and contested that not all national 
representatives were ‘equally’ recognised by the Bank. In the 
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case of Cameroon, the process resulted in mutual recognition 
of the World Bank and Cameroon. Gabon, on the other hand, 
opted for the politics of exit (sensu Feraresse 2009), whereby 
it chose to only partially engage with the Project. 
The research used a “Studying Up” (Nader 1974) approach. 
Through studying up, the research focused on the social 
dynamics of global processes at the decision-maker scale and 
required interacting with authorities, donors, and executives. 
An institutional mapping and discourse analysis was conducted 
based on Project documents and the review of literature on 
Project implementation in Central Africa. Additional data for 
this study were collected through attending meetings in or 
related to Central Africa where REDD+ was a topic of a session 
(e.g. the Congo Basin Forest Partnership [CBFP] meetings1, 
Center for International Forest Research Forest Day, and 
the 2012 World Conservation Congress, Jeju South Korea). 
Twenty high-level interviews were conducted between 2012 
and 2013 including with one minister, one presidential advisor, 
one Ambassador, four donor representatives, three regional 
governmental representatives, three Climate Focal Points, 
one National REDD+ Coordinator, and three members of civil 
society, sometimes interviewing informants multiple times. 
The paper focuses only on the development of the Project and 
not the implementation of the Project, which occurred after 
the research was conducted.
The next section of this article describes framing and 
background from a theoretical perspective. The third section 
describes the Project origins in 2008 and two-year concept 
approval phase (2008-2010). Starting with this concept 
approval phase, the countries initially held a common vision of 
REDD+ which then started to diverge during their engagement 
with the Project (see Figure 1). This divergence increased 
during their national REDD+ preparation processes, processes 
which were independent from the Project negotiation, 
but which influenced decisions made during the Project. 
In this sense, the Project can be seen as a catalytic agent, 
which allowed pre-existing disagreements about national 
REDD+ engagement to emerge as countries developed the 
Project. The consultation with national and regional partners 
lasted eighteen months. The section describes the World Bank’s 
justifications of its institutional choices, and how national 
representatives and COMIFAC formulated their claims and 
expectations of recognition. It shows that the World Bank, 
national focal points and COMIFAC representatives each held 
different views on who was being heard at the negotiation table 
and who had the mandate to ‘represent’ the countries. Later in 
this section, we present the cases of Gabon and Cameroon. In 
the case of Gabon, the country instituted a policy of demanding 
recognition as an equal partner in all negotiation processes, 
disengaged from the REDD+ process and decided to only 
partially engage with the Project. In the case of Cameroon, 
its representative strongly challenged Project development 
but the country remained engaged in both REDD+ and the 
Project. The final section draws conclusions on regional 
collaboration and power dynamics of proposal development 
in the REDD+ context in Central Africa. 
FRAMING AND BACKGROUND
Almost half of the REDD+ funding for the African continent 
is awarded to Central Africa (Maniatis et al. 2013). There 
are studies on REDD+ in Central Africa considering gender 
(Peach Brown et al. 2011), priority setting (Sonwa et al. 2012), 
and technical capacities (Maniatis et al. 2013). Ours will, 
however, focus on how country-specific discourses, policies 
and actors help shape REDD+ (Corbera and Schroeder 2011); 
and especially on the dynamics of regional-scale initiatives 
involving multiple governments.
REDD+ implementation is a national process. However, 
because REDD+ is a global initiative, countries wishing to 
Figure 1 
Key steps in the Project development and REDD+ engagement processes
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take part are required to conform to international standards 
(UNFCCC 2013; United Nations 2015). At the time that the 
capacity-building Project described in this paper was being 
negotiated, the countries were also in various stages of the 
readiness phase of REDD+ (Figure 1). Although for official 
REDD+ pilot projects under the UN-REDD or FCPF projects 
governments assign national governmental institutions through 
which support needs to be directed, in the case of capacity 
building projects (which are largely outside of these processes), 
donors and agencies, here called intervening agents, may play 
a role in choosing the partners with whom they will work. In 
the case we will present here, we describe this process for a 
REDD+ capacity building Project. The process by which an 
intervening agent chooses to work with a particular institution 
is called ‘institutional choice’ (Ribot 2012). The institutional 
choices of intervening agents may focus on different levels 
of an organisation. For example, an international NGO may 
choose to work with a national NGO partner or a national NGO 
may choose to work with specific village-level institutions. 
Similarly, as the study case will attest, within the context of 
project development, donors may choose to work with both 
regional and national-scale institutions. Once chosen, the 
particular institution receives recognition by the intervening 
agency: its legitimacy is acknowledged by being endowed 
with decision-making powers as well as with financial means 
(such as project funding) (Ribot et al. 2008). 
This article aims to contribute to the scholarship on 
recognition, in the light of work that focuses on the ‘struggle’ 
for recognition (e.g. claims by ethnic minorities for equality), 
where both sides must interact, or “play”, for recognition to 
occur (Ferrarese 2009). The theory of recognition, originating 
from Hegelian philosophy, has since been problematised 
through a lens of political theory (Fraser and Honneth 2003). 
Recognition, as described by Hegel, is a process through which 
individuals have an ‘intersubjective encounter’ resulting in 
an interdependency where they ‘struggle’ within a ‘space of 
reasons’; this results in one party recognising (acknowledging 
and affirming) the other (Honneth 2012). One example of 
this is the struggle by local people to have their customary 
land tenure recognised in REDD+ projects in Tanzania 
(Beymer-Farris and Bassett 2012).
Honneth recently applied these ideas to international 
relations. In his analysis of how states seek legitimacy, he 
specifies that, there is a ‘desire for international recognition’ 
oriented around the involvement, rather than the exclusion of 
other states, being influenced by interactions with other states 
or parties (Honneth 2012: 142). However, these interactions of 
state representatives may be driven by the representative’s own 
ideology and experience: “because political representatives 
must preserve legitimacy by acting as interpreters of the 
experiences and desires of their own respective citizenry, 
all encounters and relationships between states stand under 
the moral pressure generated by a conflict over recognition” 
(Honneth 2012). Stated as such, recognition involves a 
complex struggle involving individuals, governments and 
international organisations. During such processes, the blurring 
of national and international interests can occur where the 
international processes and related donors may interact with 
national processes and actors in ways that promote both 
interests in diverse ways (Reyniers 2016).
Although Honneth’s examples were drawn from inter-state 
conflict, it is possible to consider the inter-state and donor-state 
relations in REDD+ through applying the Choice and 
Recognition Framework (Ribot et al. 2008); this framework 
focuses on intergroup relations and how institutional choices 
impact the recognition and power dynamics of organisations. 
The framework modulates the Hegel-Honneth concept of 
recognition, and its effects, from the individual up to the 
institutional level (Ribot et al. 2008). This take on recognition, 
however, can be enriched by theories of recognition which 
consider it to be a “performative act”, whereby recognition may 
be conceived as a play in which there are actors (Markell 2000). 
Recognition can take many forms such as political or legal 
recognition of collective entities (Emcke 2002), but often it 
first must be claimed. Claims for recognition can manifest 
in a variety of ways (e.g. protests, dialogue, refusal to 
negotiate with a group) and may occur during an “instance of 
recognition” whereby the conditions for recognition, as agreed 
by the parties, are accepted or rejected (Ferrarese 2009), the 
latter, also known as misrecognition (Taylor 1992; see Faye 
2017 for further nuances). A demand for recognition can 
arise because there is a lack of recognition and the process 
of being recognised by another entity is thought to improve 
the situation; in this sense, it is part of a political struggle 
(Thomassen 2011).
As Allan and Dauvergne write, “The North needs the South 
to preserve, maintain or repair the global environment” (2013). 
In the REDD+ context, this can be seen through the lens of 
recognition whereby Northern carbon-emitting countries and 
southern carbon-absorbing countries recognise each other 
in the process to mitigate climate change. This recognition 
process often results in REDD+ policies developing in 
different ways according to national contexts and influenced 
by historical, cultural, and societal legacies (Easterly 2013; 
Grindle and Thomas 1989; Mkandawire 2014). However, 
this process can be seen as a play of recognition, taking place 
within a particular framework, where access to international 
funding (Grindle & Thomas 1989) is an important factor. As 
Mkandawire (2014: 190) notes “economic conjuncture is 
important in determining the donors’ leverage and recipient’s 
acceptance of foreign diktat and the balance of forces between 
domestic and external forces”. 
ARGUMENT
The International REDD+ and Congo Basin Regional 
REDD+ Project
The in i t i a l  idea  of  p ropos ing  a  reg iona l - sca le 
REDD+ capacity-building project arose in Libreville, Gabon 
in February 2008 (COMIFAC 2010). The six member countries 
of COMIFAC agreed on a concept note that was submitted 
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to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) Council late 
that year. In this concept note all countries indicated their 
willingness to build their ‘technical capacity’ to engage in 
REDD+. At that time, all countries were at the same level 
of REDD+ engagement: none had formally engaged in the 
then-new process. Between 2008, when the concept note was 
submitted, and 2010, when the Project concept was approved 
by the GEF, much had changed regarding each country’s 
engagement with REDD+. This change in their national level 
REDD+ implementation heavily impacted their desire to 
engage with the Project (see Figure 1).
The discourse underpinning the six Central African 
countries’ willingness to engage with REDD+ in the Concept 
Note was shaped by the previously agreed COMIFAC vision of 
sustainably managing forests across state boundaries – including 
harmonising their legal frameworks, increasing each country’s 
technical capacities, and knowledge on sustainable forest 
management. This vision, and the discourse that articulated it, 
constituted the basis for creating a space for common reasoning 
amongst states regarding a regional capacity-building project, 
creating also a framework for the interaction among the 
states that Honneth described. This section explores how 
the REDD+ development phase resulted in a differentiation in 
the countries’ engagement with the Project, and simultaneously, 
in their moving away from this initial common vision, which 
led one Climate Change Focal Point to conclude that the 
Project process caused an “explosion of the Congo Basin” 
(Douala, Cameroon, in person interview, 2013), a perception 
likely linked to the changing dynamics of REDD+ engagement 
by each country and the changing regional vision for how 
COMIFAC countries engaged with climate change issues. 
During this period of Project development, COMIFAC was 
refining its regional vision for sustainable forest management; 
the previous ‘Plan de Convergence’ did not mention climate 
change (COMIFAC 2005), whereas the one approved in 2015 
did, specifically mentioning REDD+ (e.g. COMIFAC 2015). 
In 2007, at the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties 13 in 
Bali, COMIFAC representatives were able, along with other 
states, to negotiate for its member countries to extend the 
now REDD+ to include sustainable development (Allan and 
Dauvergne 2013). This joint vision on REDD+ continued 
the following year, when the COMIFAC member countries 
agreed to propose a regional Project; this same year, the FCPF 
was created. Under this program, which complements the 
UNFCCC, a ‘Readiness Fund’ was established to help states 
prepare for REDD+. To qualify for FCPF Readiness Funds, 
countries are required to take certain steps towards REDD+ 
implementation, determining what it meant to be recognised 
as ‘legitimate stakeholders’ in REDD+ and receive funds from 
the newly created FCPF. The countries were expected to abide 
by the conditions that set the new terms of engagement. The 
first step in the process is for the countries to submit what 
was then called a Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN). Once 
the R-PIN is approved by the FCPF, the country governments 
must then submit a Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP). 
Other funds, such as those of the Project described in this 
study, were made available to support country engagement in 
the REDD+ process, but external to the FCPF and UNREDD 
processes. Through the Project concept note text, the six 
Central African governments had expressed their expectation 
of, and demand for, recognition to international donors that 
funded REDD+ related programmes. 
In 2008, the FCPF had approved the R-PPs of the countries 
negotiating the Project except for Equatorial Guinea2. Each 
of these countries had different speeds of engagement with 
the REDD+ process (FCPF 2017). While the DRC took one 
year to submit the R-PP, the Republic of Congo took close 
to two years, followed by Cameroon where the process took 
three years (Figure 1). This indicated that while the DRC, the 
Republic of Congo and Cameroon all remained engaged with 
REDD+ (thus, continued to demand recognition), the time 
for each country to produce an acceptable R-PP was different 
(Maniatis et al.  2013)3. Another difference also emerged during 
this period where some countries continued their engagement 
despite the length of period that required them to have their 
R-PP approved (e.g. Cameroon), while others disengaged from 
the process (e.g. Gabon).  Gabon took less time to complete 
the requirements to be eligible for a R-PP preparation grant 
than Cameroon (Maniatis et al. 2013); it paused its engagement 
in 2009 at the stage of R-PP grant submission and preferred 
to opt for a Low Emissions Development approach (as we 
explain below), which promotes a holistic development 
approach cross sectors while reducing emissions. Furthermore, 
the DRC advanced very quickly in their REDD+ process. 
Some interviewees perceived this advancement being due 
to preferential support by UN-REDD, and in the process, 
undermining regional collaboration (COMIFAC 2012b: 
12). The various speeds at which countries prepared for 
REDD+ caused a difference in the regional playing field, 
something that the Project was originally meant to address. A 
Climate Change Focal Point expressed that he believed that 
the UN-REDD choice to facilitate one country over another 
was “destroying” COMIFAC (Douala, Cameroon, speech 
at the CBFP meeting, 2012). Such differences in REDD+ 
engagement had impacts on Project development, as we will 
describe later.
After Project approval in 2011, this divergence among 
COMIFAC countries on REDD+ continued and became salient 
during the international climate change negotiations. During 
the UNFCCC’s 17th Conference of the Parties (COP-17) in 
Durban, held in 2012, a joint declaration on REDD+ was 
signed by some COMIFAC governments and donors; Gabon 
refused to sign this joint declaration, and Equatorial Guinea 
was not present at the meeting (Maniatis et al. 2013). Later, 
COMIFAC updated its regional ‘Plan de Convergence’ where 
REDD+ is considered as one approach to achieve sustainable 
forest management (COMIFAC 2015). At the time of the 
Project negotiation, there was no agreed regional vision for 
REDD+ in Central Africa. This lack of a regional consensus 
was clear in Project documents, studies, public statements 
at meetings, and in interviews during the study period. At a 
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Congo Basin Forest Partnership meeting in Douala in 2013, a 
regional REDD+ project manager from Central Africa publicly 
asked: “is there really a communal position on REDD+ or is 
this just a façade?” 
This statement and related events suggest that the regional 
vision for REDD+ that had emerged in 2008 had disintegrated 
over the course of two years, causing strong interactions 
between what was happening in international climate change 
negotiations and engagement with REDD+ processes to have 
an impact on Project development. 
As we have shown in this section, the gap among the 
countries’ engagement with REDD+ increasingly widened 
after the acceptance of the Project Concept Note, during the 
R-PP development process. The following section focuses on 
the Project negotiations that took place among COMIFAC, the 
World Bank and the country Focal Points between 2010 and 
2011. During this time, when the individual countries’ R-PP 
development was ongoing, an 18-month REDD+ Project 
consultation process was initiated. As we will show, these 
consultations opened a space for debate and expression of 
differences of opinions regarding the mandate of COMIFAC 
and the climate change focal points. We argue that these 
differences showed how the ‘negotiation’ table was shaped 
by the institutional choices of the GEF Project execution 
agency4, the World Bank, and how different recognition 
claims were put forth by those recognised as being part of 
this political space. 
Creating the negotiation table: the institutional choices 
and recognition claims 
After the GEF’s approval of the Concept Note in 2010, the 
Project content was developed and was initiated under the 
coordination of COMIFAC. At this time, the FCPF was also 
preparing grants at the national level which were intended to be 
complementary to the Project and focus on national needs. The 
Project was meant to coordinate with FCPF (and UN-REDD) 
and avoid redundancies and inefficiencies. COMIFAC’s 
recognition as the Project Coordinating organisation or by the 
World Bank and country governments was a key institutional 
choice. Although the World Bank and country representatives 
chose COMIFAC for this role5, their reasons to grant this 
recognition were different6.  
COMIFAC, as an international organisation, is composed 
of Congo Basin states represented by their “national 
institutions in charge of forests” (e.g. Ministries of Forest) 
(COMIFAC 2012b, 12). The member states, through their 
forest ministries, jointly decide on priority actions that 
could harmonise their sustainable forest management and 
conservation policies according to an agreed Convergence 
Plan (COMIFAC 2005). However, COMIFAC cannot bring 
governments to order and there is no sanctioning process if 
governments do not carry out decisions made by COMIFAC’s 
Council of Ministers (Kam Yogo 2012). Therefore, COMIFAC 
cannot hold member states accountable for their actions that 
diverge from the agreed Convergence Plan. 
The main reasons behind the Congo Basin governments’ 
recognition of COMIFAC as the coordinator of a regional-scale 
Project was that COMIFAC had already been carrying out this 
coordination role in sustainable forest management, and that 
they expected the same type of ‘high-level’ coordination – that 
is a coordination at the level of forest ministries – in other 
arenas, such as climate change and therefore REDD+. For 
Climate Focal Points7, who represent their governments’ 
Ministries of Forests or Ministries of Environment in 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
negotiations, the Project was expected to be a primarily 
country-driven process. COMIFAC is not a ‘representative’ 
of the countries, in the sense that it can impose sanctions on 
members in case of non-compliance but it can only act as a 
facilitator in the negotiations among those countries. In such 
cooperation, the Executive Secretary of COMIFAC does not 
represent the participating countries, only Climate Focal Points 
of COMIFAC member states do. 
The World Bank’s concept of recognition of COMIFAC 
as the legitimate representative of a regional-scale project 
however differed from that of Climate Focal Points. The World 
Bank considered a regional-scale project to be an innovation in 
their traditional approach which typically focuses on national 
projects. According to this vision, the Congo Basin Project was 
not a ‘multi-country’ project, where the country’s weight in 
decision-making and benefit sharing is determined according 
to commonly agreed principles. It was considered to be a 
‘regional’ project and each country was expected to make 
‘compromises’ to increase the ‘benefits’ of the whole region, 
while reducing administrative costs of administering several 
national projects and complementing other REDD+ grants 
(e.g. FCPF) to the countries which focused on national needs. 
While the World Bank representatives seemed to accept the 
National Focal points’ decision-making authority by stating 
that they would hold the majority of the seats in the steering 
committee and so “reflect the dominant role that countries 
play in project decision making” (COMIFAC 2012a, 12), the 
interviews with Bank officials and Project managers seemed to 
indicate that the Bank’s expectation from COMIFAC in return 
for the Bank’s granting its institutional recognition, was for 
COMIFAC to ‘represent’ the member country governments 
in Project negotiations. Thus the expectations of the role of 
COMIFAC in the Project were different by the World Bank 
and the countries. 
This struggle over representation came to surface during 
the 18-month Project consultation process, which refined 
the Project activities and budget and was coordinated 
by COMIFAC. COMIFAC representatives regarded this 
consultation process as being “largely participatory” 
(COMIFAC 2012b). Yet, during the regional consultation 
meetings, National REDD+ focal points openly stated that the 
Project consultations were carried out following a top-down 
approach. According to one person on the Project steering 
committee, the World Bank was making decisions in the 
place of the governments, despite ideas being put forward by 
governmental representatives during Project development. 
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During Project negotiations, the World Bank sought to create 
a regional Project in line with the original Concept Note which 
addressed the original needs for REDD+ capacity in 2008 when 
all countries were at the beginning of their REDD+ national 
processes. These perceptions and claims demonstrate that the 
development of the Project occurred in a complex setting with 
many issues at play and which evolved during the early stages 
of Project idea development. The needs were quite different 
when the Project content was being negotiated two years later. 
Thus, during Project development, country focal points sought 
to have the varying national progress in REDD+ be considered 
in the Project while additionally allowing the countries to 
maintain some control over national funding, which was later 
agreed.
During the consultations, which were central to the 
negotiation of a regional Project, the role of COMIFAC 
also became a subject of debate. One World Bank project 
designer said that “the member states did not appear to 
support COMIFAC” and that the COMIFAC coordinator 
was not “communicating enough” to the national Focal 
Points (Yaoundé, Cameroon, in person interview, 2012). The 
same person later indicated at several Project meetings that 
COMIFAC seemed only to “decorate” the meeting, with states 
seemingly not wanting COMIFAC to manage work at the 
national level (Yaoundé, Cameroon, in person interview, 2013). 
This indicated clearly that the World Bank was expecting 
COMIFAC to play a different role, especially in terms of 
financial accountability, than what the country governments 
were expecting.
There was also a debate about the role of the Focal Points. 
COMIFAC representatives stressed that the Focal Points 
were effectively representing their respective governments’ 
point of view and interests. But one Project developer of the 
World Bank insisted that some Focal Points were not doing 
so, questioning the representation and accountability of them 
to their forestry ministers in the Project development process. 
He claimed that the Focal Points, which were chosen and 
recognised by their Ministers, did not properly represent the 
Ministries’ views and were not accountable to them. Other 
World Bank Project designers claimed that the World Bank and 
the civil society organisations considered the national Focal 
Points to have “too much power” in the process, implying that 
they acted outside of the representation role given to them by 
their Ministries. This showed that while there was a mutual 
recognition amongst COMIFAC and the Focal Points, this did 
not seem to be the case for the World Bank. 
At the Project negotiation table, one of the chief concerns 
and points of divergence between the World Bank and the 
COMIFAC country representatives was the distribution 
of funds. The negotiations on the distribution of funding 
constituted, therefore, another instance where the struggle over 
recognition between the World Bank, national Focal Points, 
and senior members of the COMIFAC Secretariat took place. 
In line with the vision of a ‘regional’ approach to project 
development, the World Bank Project developers argued for 
the necessity and validity of the World Bank’s regional vision 
by claiming that a multi-country project does not necessarily 
have benefits for the region, whereas a regional project will 
have benefits for all countries involved. Their argument was 
based on the affirmation that the main objective of the Project 
was to build the “capacity” of all countries. They presented 
“capacity building” as the most important ‘common’ goal and 
‘collective’ problem of the region. Thus, the states brought their 
country budgets together to achieve an economy of scale in 
addressing this collective problem. The World Bank insisted 
that the funds of all countries, pooled together, should be used 
to “equalize” all countries’ REDD+ capacity. The Focal Points, 
however, argued that the funds should be allocated according 
to each country’s needs. At every preparatory meeting, the 
discussion went back to negotiation of the country budgets 
(or “envelopes”). According to World Bank Project developers, 
the insistence of the country representatives in understanding 
the benefit they would gain in pooling of their money for a 
regional project was problematic. They claimed that the Project 
was “regional” and this should not be an issue because all 
countries would benefit from it. By contrast, many national 
Focal Points did not agree with this approach and wished to 
have more decision-making power over how funding at the 
national level would be spent. Several focal points argued 
that the World Bank “acted like it was their money”, when in 
fact the Project funding allocation was meant to be decided 
amongst the countries, with the World Bank supervisory role 
to ensure the efficient use of funds. The World Bank was keen 
to have the Project be a complement to the national funding 
being awarded by the FCPF and so wanted to ensure that the 
national envelopes did not duplicate this funding source.
These discussions over the budget and country envelopes 
are significant from the perspective of recognition debates in 
several respects. First, as Ribot and others have argued (2008), 
one of the most important implications of the institutional 
choices of intervening agents, like the World Bank, is to 
provide technical and financial means to institutions that they 
recognise. As such, the provision of financial means constitutes 
an act of recognition. Considering that recognition is two-sided, 
this implies that the provision of financial means as an act 
of recognition is accepted by both the intervening agents, 
which grant recognition, and by the country governments, 
which expect and ask for international recognition. Yet, 
the expectation of the National Focal Points – representing 
their government’s interests and expectations – involves the 
recognition of their decision-making power concerning the 
‘envelopes’ granted to them. Thus, the World Bank’s insistence 
in holding the decision-making power regarding the spending 
of the country funds with COMIFAC, and introducing the 
condition that each country should be using its national 
‘envelopes’ to level the ‘playing field’ at regional scale, was 
understood as a partial recognition. The World Bank as the 
executing agency of the Project and its funds was thought to 
be overstepping its mandate by trying to force many decisions 
during the Project development process. In one meeting in 
Brazzaville, a World Bank representative publicly questioned 
one national representative’s views on the Project, leaving 
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many with the impression that Project development was not 
a country-driven process (Yaoundé, Cameroon, in person 
interview, 2013). 
Nonetheless, a common ground was found and national 
envelopes (contributions within the regional project which were 
granted back to the countries) were created by restructuring the 
budget to allocate funds to the envelopes. Even though some 
Focal Points considered the cancelling of proposed regional 
studies to create country envelopes to be spent according to 
government’s needs and priorities as a success, the overall 
feeling regarding how far the Project answered the countries’ 
expectations and demands for recognition at the negotiation 
table was mixed. Some Focal Points were very vocal about their 
opinion that their government’s needs and interests – whom 
they claimed to represent- was not granted sufficient ‘voice’. 
Some national Focal Points shared the idea that the World Bank 
was imposing too many conditions during Project development 
on the member country states. On the other hand, one Focal 
Point considered the approach of high-level consultation on 
the Project to be a positive, but rare approach (phone interview, 
2013). Similarly, one senior member of the COMIFAC 
Secretariat considered the Project to be a model, giving 
COMIFAC high visibility (Yaoundé, Cameroon, in person 
interview, 2013). For COMIFAC, this regional approach was 
important for the international recognition of the organisation. 
At the Project launch in April 2012, one member of an 
international organisation observed that many partners 
were unsatisfied with the World Bank’s approach to project 
administration, as it placed too many conditions on the states, 
creating a humiliating process for them (Switzerland, in person 
interview, 2013). This concurs with some national viewpoints. 
One Focal Point said that some donors use COMIFAC to push 
an agenda on countries. He added that even if donors attempted 
to benefit from the weakness of representing their interests, 
countries should become more responsible for representing 
their interests. At the end, he also underlined that “COMIFAC 
represents us.” At the same time, he recognised that COMIFAC 
was still considered as a ‘representative’ of the region’s 
governments’ collective interests, and the country governments 
should have worked harder to create a more democratic forum 
for the Project negotiation process. 
By contrast, COMIFAC disagreed that it was being used by 
the World Bank to impose their views. One senior member 
of the COMIFAC secretariat said that the World Bank never 
imposed their ideas on the states (Yaoundé, Cameroon, in 
person interview, 2013). However, in other environmental fora, 
the COMIFAC Secretariat acknowledges the unequal power 
relations that often exist between the donors and the member 
states. In a Congo Basin Forest Partnership meeting speech 
(Douala, March 2013), the COMIFAC Executive Secretary 
publicly commented, although not directly referencing the 
Project, that in general many projects did not have proper 
consultation on project development. He argued that those 
with money (donors) ‘direct’ (in French, ‘commandent’) the 
activities of others, suggesting an unequal power relation 
between funding donors and recipients. This unequal power 
relation, manifest in donor control of some funding and decision-
making processes, is also inherent in the Project negotiation 
table described here, which became an arena of struggle for 
recognition. The Congo Basin countries had formulated their 
expectations of recognition and demanded recognition from 
the World Bank through their initial adherence to the Project 
concept. This indicated their willingness to be recognised. 
At the same time it indicated they considered the donors 
as indispensable providers of recognition (Ferrarese 2009). 
Participation in the international climate change negotiations 
brought them status in the international political sphere and 
strengthened their legitimacy at the international level, which 
probably strengthened their position to negotiate the Project 
with the World Bank, in this instance. At the same time, the 
donors clearly had more financial power than any of the 
country governments involved in the Project. This power 
difference made it difficult for the country governments to push 
for full-fledged recognition of their authority, particularly in 
financial matters. There was a significant difference of opinion 
in the World Bank not wishing to duplicate other national level 
funding, and the countries wishing to have national envelopes.
If recognition through engagement with the Project 
negotiating table was shaped by these important power 
relations, including successes and failures, how do we 
explain the case of rejection of recognition? In the following 
section, two cases will be given. The case of Cameroon will 
demonstrate that the acceptance of recognition was tied 
to a particular national vision of development into which 
REDD+ was integrated. Even though the Project negotiation 
involved denial of recognition – particularly in financial 
matters – Cameroon continued its engagement in the Project. 
The case of Gabon will demonstrate that it too has a national 
vision of development, but it diverged from Cameroon 
in that it could take the risk of denial of recognition by 
the World Bank, due to availability of its own financial 
resources and its desire to pursue its own development 
agenda independently of the demands of REDD+. Thus, 
during the Project negotiation, Gabon disengaged from the 
international REDD+ process to pursue its own agenda of 
low emission development and thus agreed to only partially 
engage with the Project.
The REDD+ negotiation arena and its impact on project 
negotiation
The Case of Cameroon: REDD+ is for our development
Cameroon is one of the six countries in COMIFAC that 
accepted to be part of the REDD+ process since 2008. It started 
to be engaged more intensively with REDD+ process in 2011 
during the preparation of the REDD+ Readiness Preparation 
Proposal (R-PP).  The case of Cameroon shows that national 
interests play an important part in the search for international 
recognition through the acceptance of REDD+. However, the 
case of Cameroon is significant as this demand for recognition 
and its acceptance is formulated in a way that emphasizes 
national priorities. 
[Downloaded free from http://www.conservationandsociety.org on Tuesday, March 27, 2018, IP: 139.184.223.197]
Central Africa REDD+ project dynamics / 459
What does the REDD+ vision for Cameroon look like? 
The example given by a Cameroonian senior member of 
the national climate change negotiation team is illustrative 
of the government of Cameroon’s position on REDD+. 
Acting as a representative in both the national and regional 
REDD+ debates, this senior member regularly states publicly 
versions of the same idea, which can be summarised as “it is 
up to us [Cameroonians] to give REDD+ its content” (Douala, 
Cameroon, statement in a meeting, 2012). For him, “REDD 
needs to respond to the needs of the country” (Yaoundé, 
Cameroon, speech, 2013). 
At the 2013 ‘Sustainable Forest Management in Central 
Africa: Yesterday, today and tomorrow’ event in Yaoundé, in 
a speech, he said that all Central African countries dream of 
being an emerging economy and that, “forests here are not 
just carbon” but rather a way to develop. The Cameroonian 
representative indicated that he would not like to see the 
subsistence farmers of his country not being able to live off of 
the land (Douala, Cameroon, in person interview, 2012). These 
statements agree with the vision presented in Cameroon’s 
R-PP. The R-PP clearly states, “For Cameroon, REDD+ is 
a development tool”8 (République du Cameroun 2013: 1) 
and based on its sustainable development objective as part 
of the Document de Stratégie pour la Croissance et l’Emploi 
which aims to help Cameroon’s economy develop, focused on 
agricultural development amongst other things (Government 
of Cameroon 2009). Thus, the document underscores that the 
Cameroonian government aims to use REDD+ to modernise 
agriculture, manage rangelands and livestock, increase energy 
efficiency, and sustainable management of forest concessions. 
In the 2013 Sustainable Forest Management Day in Cameroon, 
the climate change focal point stated, “If REDD+ doesn’t 
work for development, then we need to set it aside.” To this, 
the room applauded. 
In terms of the Project described in this paper, from 
Cameroon’s perspective, it was essential to have a Project that 
could help them to carry out ‘their’ vision for development, 
which seeks economic independence. This is similar to the 
official development discourse in the 1980s, which emphasized 
endogenous development both for and by the Cameroonian 
people (Ntube 1998; Dessouane and Verre 1986). Cameroon 
sought, therefore, recognition at the Project negotiating 
table and from the World Bank as a way to advance its own 
development priorities.
During the Project negotiation, the representative for 
Cameroon continually evoked Cameroon’s vision for REDD+. 
For him, there was a need to have a national-level access 
to funding in the regional Project, rather than pooling all 
resources at the regional level and so the debate over Project 
envelopes was critical. The concurrent processes, which were 
intended to be complementary, of national-level REDD+ 
strategy development with the vision of the regional Project 
development presented here generated a constant tension 
between Cameroonian Focal Points and the World Bank. 
Some World Bank Project developers criticized Cameroon’s 
outspoken stance on its expectations of the Project. They 
argued that this stance was counterproductive to the regional 
Project, including pooling regional resources, and it was like 
‘one step forward, one step back’ at every Project development 
meeting, significantly prolonging the Project development 
process. This struggle during Project negotiations can be 
seen as a struggle for recognition of Cameroon’s national 
development vision within the political space created by 
international REDD+ negotiations. 
Despite the rocky Project negotiations, where the Cameroon 
representative took the lead on successfully negotiating 
the ‘envelopes’ as earlier described, Cameroon did agree 
to participate in the Project. However, in struggling for 
recognition of national visions in REDD+, Cameroon was 
also vulnerable. There was a risk that their vision would not be 
recognised. In such a case, Cameroon would have been faced 
with Ferrarese’s “choice of instance”, a choice made of when 
to accept or reject recognition, during which an organisation 
(such as the Government of Cameroon) decides if it will accept 
the recognition offered by international partners. 
The choice of Cameroonian representatives, acting in the 
name of their country, was a ‘choice of instance’. This choice 
was influenced by many risk factors. In rejecting the Project, 
Cameroon would have lost funding from the Project to help 
them increase their capacity to participate in the international 
climate change negotiations (since an objective of the project was 
capacity building in this area). In rejecting REDD+ altogether, 
Cameroon might have lost an opportunity to further its national 
development goals through REDD+. This points to the 
importance of the wider context in the Project negotiation arena 
in this struggle for the recognition of their vision of REDD+.
The influence of the international negotiation arena on 
Cameroon’s position in the Project negotiation table was 
clearly linked to Cameroon’s insistence on having the national 
envelopes to help them carry forth their vision for REDD+. 
Cameroon was able to use the recognition it obtained from 
sitting at the Project negotiation table to secure funds it wanted 
for advancing its national REDD+ strategy, which came in 
complement of additional funds from the FCPF. However, the 
development of national envelopes important for Cameroon 
and oriented towards national REDD+ activities catalysed a 
discussion with Gabon, which during the Project development 
was disengaging with the REDD+ process.
The case of Gabon: a demand for equal seating at the table
The case of Gabon presents another ‘choice of instance’, this 
time resulting in a threat to reject the full Project (and later 
only partially engaging with it). Early in the Project conception 
in 2008, Gabon was engaged in both the international climate 
change and regional Project processes. However, during the 
2009 presidential elections, Ali Ben Bongo Ondimba, became 
president—a change after some forty years of rule by his 
father. With him came the politics of ‘Emergence’, where it 
was promised that growing Gabon’s economy would help it 
to become a middle-income country.
Since then, the dynamics of Gabon engaging with foreign 
partners has taken a different tone, led by the President himself. 
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In a May 2012, presidential speech at Africa Day at the London 
School of Economics, the president Ali Ben Bongo Ondimba 
declared: “We need to sit confidently at the negotiation table, 
sure of our value proposition and of our strength, having 
learned from the past, taking into account the present and able 
to be decisive about a vision for the future.” He went on, “By 
playing its full role as partner, my government intends to give 
clear direction to our investors, by identifying, creating and 
promoting opportunities for you to come and work with us to 
implement a new vision for harmonious growth.” 
The idea of being equals at any table was mirrored in 
nearly every interview conducted for this study with a 
Gabonese official. According to one Gabonese Ambassador, 
Gabon is looking for “real partnership” on projects 
(Yaoundé, Cameroon, in person interview, 2012). This differs 
from neighbouring countries, which do not have this discourse 
and which tend to accept projects rather than demand to be 
co-developers. 
The Project development process coincided with the 
time when Gabon began to disengage from the REDD+ 
process as a consequence of choices not directly related to 
the project and stopped advancing its FCPF application in 
2009. This disengagement was reinforced at the UNFCCC 
COP-17 in Durban, South Africa, when a joint declaration 
on REDD+ was signed by many Central African countries 
and some donor countries (COMIFAC countries and partners 
2011), except Gabon and Equatorial Guinea9.  According 
to one presidential advisor the reason for not signing was 
that Gabon had not been consulted on the idea until the 
declaration was in an advanced draft. Indeed, Gabon was not 
represented at the preparatory meeting, which was deemed by 
one of the convenors to have been an “informal consultation” 
(Ndikumagenge 2011). In an assessment of the declaration by 
one journalist, the disengagement of Gabon (and Equatorial 
Guinea) was explained by stating that these two countries 
were in a “rare category of having high forest resources, other 
financial means and a ‘nationalist character’, which permits 
them to go-it-alone” (Wa Namasso 2012).
According to one Gabonese Ambassador, having control 
over their natural resources is important and resource use 
decisions should not be imposed from the North (Libreville, 
Gabon, in person interview, 2013). However, Gabon appears to 
be changing the terms of engagement and has begun to dictate 
its requirements for engagement with them. During a CBFP 
meeting in March 2012, the Gabon Climate Change Focal Point 
publicly declared that engagement in REDD+ did not result 
in a partnership. The same person indicated in an interview 
in Douala in March 2013, that according to his government, 
“One should not hold out one’s hand for gifts, but rather, shake 
another’s hand [as equals]”. As another Gabonese official 
clearly stated, “Gabon does not wish to have things imposed 
on it, but rather wants a partnership” (speech by Gabon’s 
COMIFAC Focal Point, 12th PFBC meeting, March 2013).
During Project development, Gabon ceased to engage in 
REDD+ and also threatened to withdraw from the Project, 
especially when national envelopes focused on REDD+ 
were proposed. Gabon was then demonised by regional and 
international actors for their proposed withdrawal, according to 
one senior governmental advisor. At later stages in the Project 
consultation process, there were attempts by the COMIFAC 
secretariat to convince Gabon to remain fully in the Project. 
When Gabon signalled that it would withdraw from the Project, 
one of Gabon’s senior governmental advisors noted that they 
had explained their position on REDD+, but the COMIFAC 
Secretariat preferred to expect Gabon’s participation (World 
Conservation Congress, in person interview, 2013). Gabon 
later only signed a “partial implementation agreement for the 
execution of one subcomponent” (World Bank 2016). According 
to one senior governmental advisor, Gabon, rather, sought to 
develop their country on their own terms, rather than according 
to the timing and demands of the international REDD+ process. 
With REDD+ being the focus of the national Project envelopes, 
Gabon could not agree to accept this part of the Project.
Interviewees explained Gabon’s threat of Project 
disengagement in various ways. Although some Project 
developers said that Gabon’s threat of disengagement was due 
to personal politics or their financial resources enabling them 
to turn down climate finance, information from other sources 
presented here show that Gabon’s condition for engaging in 
projects was that it wanted to be consulted as an equal partner. 
They noted that Gabon can posit this condition because it is 
not dependent on REDD+ funds. 
What enables a country to exercise their right to refuse 
participation in such international projects?  Gabon’s exit 
from the REDD+ process and threat to disengage from the 
Project itself reset the power dynamic – by demonstrating that 
Gabon did not need to play the game set up by others around 
the ‘table’. Groups seeking recognition may use a “refusal 
to sit down at the negotiating table” (Ferrarese 2009: 607) to 
change the conditions of the negotiations. Here Gabon clearly 
stated that it wants such recognition – equal recognition that the 
discourse of the Project and REDD+ processes laid out as their 
operating principle. Gabonese officials use the same metaphor 
of a table with the possible seating of equals. Their ability to 
withdraw enabled them to negotiate equal rank, while also 
continuing on their own path to climate smart development, 
as envisaged in their national plans. 
But, what are the costs of Gabon rejecting the REDD+ process 
or a related Project? Clearly, rejecting REDD+ has a cost for 
international climate change mitigation advocates. It might 
diminish the international fight against climate change, which 
could be the case if Gabon were not already engaged in low 
emissions development. Globally the advocates of REDD+ 
consider these costs to be high. Nationally, the costs may also 
be high. Firstly, resources linked to these relationships may be 
reduced, in this case both in terms of carbon credits purchased 
and forests as the key source to carbon credit schemes. 
Secondly, rejecting this global REDD+ process could damage 
Gabon’s relations with organisations or individuals that are 
important collaborators on other fronts, such as infrastructure 
development, biodiversity conservation and other national 
priorities (Ferrarese 2009: 611).  
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In Gabon’s case, the FCPF now classifies Gabon as an 
‘inactive country’ and one which has ‘lost guaranteed access 
to FCPF grant funding (FCPF 2013)’. Although Gabon 
wished to engage on climate smart development on their 
own terms, there are other reasons that Gabon might be able 
to choose to be inactive, rooted in Gabon’s history as being 
more economically independent through high petroleum rents. 
Gabon is one of the most important oil producers in Africa, and 
oil rents have driven the country’s higher GDP (Wunder 2003). 
Oil rent in many ways fostered an economic independence 
in terms of funding development projects, as detailed in the 
Premier Plan de Développement Economique et Social in 
1966 (Yates 1996)10.
Furthermore, Gabon has a history of engaging on endeavours 
on their own terms. The best example was the construction 
of the costly Transgabonais Railroad in the 1980s11 despite 
loans being refused from the World Bank and being generally 
discouraged by other governments to conduct the project 
(Pourtier 1989), it was constructed against all odds and led by 
the President, himself (Yates 1996). Historian Yates quoted the 
then President, when discussing why Gabon at that time was 
moving towards modernisation at all costs, “We want to do in 
a few decades what others took centuries to do” (Yates 1996: 
183 citing World Bank 1991; World Bank 1991).
This threat of rejection of the Project constituted a ‘choice 
of instance’ whereby Gabon proposed to leave the Project 
negotiation table. A second ‘choice of instance’ occurred when 
Gabon did not sign the regional REDD+ declaration. Although 
both Cameroon and Gabon have attempted different models 
of economic independence, Gabon’s tradition of developing 
independently combined with a higher GDP seems to play 
a large role in its ability to choose which tables to sit at and 
which to abandon. 
Project negotiations may never be easy, however, it is 
possible that the recognition that the Climate Change Focal 
Points achieved in the international climate change negotiation 
arena gave them a higher status and expectation of being treated 
differently by a donor like the World Bank. During the time of 
the project, as one informant noted, this power dynamic was 
shifting the power balance towards them in a way that had 
possibly not happened prior to the climate change negotiations. 
This shift likely caused the World Bank to rethink how they 
work with national representatives in project development. 
Indeed, more spaces for equitable engagement are needed in 
the environmental sector and it falls to those with traditionally 
more power to enable those spaces (Martin et al. 2016).
CONCLUSION
Africa’s forests are a key area needed to stabilise the world’s 
changing climate. Their integration in REDD+ can be central 
to achieving climate change mitigation. However, African 
governments have been weak in influencing REDD+ agendas, 
often finding themselves on the receiving end of information 
(Atela et al. 2016), something that the Project analysed in this 
article sought to address. The effectiveness of REDD+ projects 
remains to be seen, for example, in how much they can 
influence changes in land tenure (Larson et al. 2013) or other 
aspects related to forests.  Project governance can also be 
a factor shaping REDD+ projects’ contribution to reducing 
pressures on forests. The global agenda of climate mitigation, 
however, cannot be achieved if the international proponents do 
not recognise the agendas and needs of countries upon which 
successful mitigation depends. To maintain the engagement 
of countries that actually have the ability to withdraw at the 
negotiating table, negotiations must start with participatory 
parity (e.g. Fraser 2003). They will not accept subordination 
of their forests or people to external agendas. 
North-South relations via donors and international agencies 
in Africa have been explored through multiple lenses, focusing 
on paternalism and partnership (Murithi 2011), elite policy 
transfer (Chiumbu 2011) and top-down versus bottom up 
approaches (Green 2012). Project development, especially 
in the climate change arena, is one area in which the politics 
of recognition between international and national interests 
plays out. 
In her analysis of claims for recognition, Fraser indicates 
that for the claim to be valid, claimants should show that the 
institutionalised, dominant thinking denies parity and that 
the solution proposed does not deny parity to other parties 
(Fraser 2003: 39–41). In Gabon’s case, their request for a seat 
at the table signals that there is an inequality of those currently 
sitting at the table versus those denied a seat. Furthermore, 
if their request is granted, Gabon gaining a seat may still 
leave neighbouring countries outside of this negotiation 
table. Although Fraser might consider this to invalidate a 
claim, in this case it does not. If Gabon obtains a place at the 
table, their presence and the noted absence of other Central 
African countries would demonstrate further inequality. 
Such a table would likely open up other seats in the future, 
as future processes would likely not be able to deny seats to 
neighbouring countries. Indeed, it opens up a process whereby 
recognition can change how representation of particular parties 
is viewed; this can be seen as an ongoing process where both 
past and current recognition can influence how parties are 
perceived (Thomassen 2011).  
The instances of recognition described here are part of 
the performative act with each instance changing how 
the ‘subjects’ (here, the national representatives and their 
viewpoints) are constantly ‘constituted and reconstituted’ 
(Ferrarese 2011: 766). Such dynamics could change according 
to who has a seat at the table and could drive other countries 
to reformulate their recognition demands, questioning the 
parity in decision making processes within the common 
political space. The development of new forms of recognition 
of these countries is a process of interaction with multiple 
‘recognitions or misrecognitions’ contributing to the forming 
of new identities (Ferrarese 2011: 766).
Although many studies in REDD+ focus on power 
inequalities and lack of negotiating power at the subnational 
level (Beymar-Farris and Bassett 2012; Fairhead et al. 
2012; Leach and Scoones 2014; Ribot and Larson 2012; 
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Chomba 2017), there are also challenges at the national 
level. As the cases of Cameroon and Gabon illustrate, the 
negotiation of a project confers recognition to those sitting 
at the negotiation table, however the reasons for accepting 
recognition or being misrecognised are likely linked to the 
wider climate change arena, in this case an international one, 
in which the negotiating parties are embedded. 
In Central Africa, countries engage in different ways. 
Several country representatives praised the Project as a rare 
case of full consultation. Indeed, one country representative 
said that based on the experience, he and his colleagues were 
pressuring other donors to consult with them in a similar 
way (phone interview, 2013). This engaging and disengaging 
appears to happen in an ‘instance of recognition’, where those 
who are being offered recognition or misrecognition accept or 
reject it. The result of such an instance is likely determined by 
contributing factors from the negotiating table and including 
development policies and economics. In the case of Cameroon, 
recognition in REDD+ is granted and accepted by both parties 
as the country continues on the path of REDD+ Readiness. By 
contrast, Gabon has attempted to reset the negotiation table for 
them, and possibly for neighbouring countries, by disengaging 
from the REDD+ process and only partially engaging with 
the Project in order to continue their climate-change sensitive 
development plan on their own terms. Such a stance is not 
easily made in a context where many countries engage in 
REDD+ and where African NGOs, which heavily sway 
national REDD+ consultations (see Marfo 2015; Mbeche 2017; 
Nuesiri 2017), are influenced by much more powerful donors 
and larger NGOs (Hearn 2007) with decisions appearing to 
be made for Africa, rather than with her (Mbele 2010; Mbele 
2015). Countries struggle to progress with REDD+ readiness 
phases; the complications of advancing REDD+ in a complex 
environment with governance and financial challenges may 
significantly reduce effectiveness of REDD+ or other climate 
change mitigation measures in Africa, potentially with global 
implications for the magnitude and consequences of climate 
change (Gizachew et al. 2017).
The issues described here in terms of project development 
are not unique and are likely part of other project development 
processes, especially in terms of unequal power balances of 
the donor and recipient. There is much to be learned from 
the process to inform future regional collaborative project 
development. First, when participating in collaborative 
project development, intervening agents must realise that in 
choosing an institution, a form of recognition occurs when 
that choice is accompanied by supporting full engagement 
with the recognised institution in terms of project negotiation. 
The expectations and actualities must be understood by all 
parties. The strain between governments and international 
organisations, such as the World Bank, can cause tension, 
sometimes referred to as ‘agency slippage’, when the 
governmental views are different from those of the international 
organisation (e.g. the World Bank, in this case) (Nielson and 
Tierney 2003). Participation in the project development process 
can range from nominal (consultation) to transformative 
(involving decision-making); to be effective, all participants 
must have the same understanding of the type of project 
development engagement expected (Biggs and Smith 2003). 
In this case, although the Project was a new regional approach 
to development for the World Bank, the Project consultation 
process may have stymied innovation by country participants, 
making the negotiation process difficult, even if eventually a 
common ground is achieved. 
The project cycle was also not able to accommodate national 
views easily. In some cases, this could render impotent the good 
intentions of committed project developers (Green 2012: 248). 
Although many donor agency project management cycles are 
rigid, they can be adapted to interface in a productive way 
with the culture of the governments with which they work 
(Biggs and Smith 2003). But to have a truly participatory 
process, one must expect a divergence of views to be expressed 
before agreement is reached (White 1996). Nonetheless, 
countries are sovereign entities and decision over project 
content and participation should be granted to the fullest extent, 
ensuring that stakeholders have equal power at the table.
At the same time that this World Bank-led Project was 
being developed, the Food and Agriculture Organisation was 
developing a regional REDD+ project through consultation 
with the same national representatives. In this other project the 
decision-making power accorded during project development 
to national representatives transferred a lot of power to the 
countries; this level of decision making was considered 
to be very high by the organisation’s standards (Douala, 
Cameroon, in person interview, 2013). However, this donor 
chose to administer the project itself, creating a separate 
management unit for that purpose, rather than transferring 
project administration to regional or national partners. As such, 
little recognition of regional or national bodies occurred and 
the project had far less ownership than the one studied in this 
article. Clearly, the institutional choices have implications 
not only for recognising stakeholders but also in developing 
projects that are owned and implemented nationally.
These two projects piloted new ways for donors to work 
with countries and they continue this process in the Central 
Africa region with the Central Africa Forest Fund. What future 
donors expect from the countries and how their institutional 
choices shape their work with countries remains to be seen. 
Similarly, how countries alter their expectations in relation to 
these choices is likely to change. 
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NOTES
1. The CBFP is a partnership of more than 70 members including 
states and NGOs working on conservation issues in Central 
Africa.
2. Of the 36 FCPF country participants, there are five participating 
COMIFAC countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo and Gabon.
3. According to Maniatis et al., countries show differences in their 
‘state of advancement’ in the REDD+ adoption process. More 
advanced countries are developing approaches for measuring 
carbon, have a strategy for political engagement and have 
financing to engage; less advanced countries lack these things 
despite expressing interest in the process.
4. “GEF Agencies are responsible for creating project proposals 
and for managing GEF projects. The GEF Agencies play a key 
role in managing GEF projects on the ground; more specifically, 
GEF Agencies assist eligible governments and NGOs in the 
development, implementation, and management of GEF 
projects. (http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_agencies, accessed 11 
March 2016)” 
5. Interview with a project manager of another regional REDD+ 
project,12 February 2013, Yaoundé,12 February 2013.
6. According to the project appraisal document, COMIFAC was 
recognised as having a mandate for ‘regional coordination, but 
not project implementation”’(World Bank 2011).
7. The REDD+ Climate Change Focal Points are officials who 
hold high-level posts in the forest ministries of each country 
and represent the country at the UNFCCC meetings.
8. A vision commonly held by other Central African countries 
(Peach Brown et al. 2011).
9. Signed by Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, DRC, R. Congo, 
Rwanda, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Norway, the 
United Kingdom, the USA, and the European Commission.
10. Although this has not been without consequences, notably in the 
poor results of the projects themselves or the results on ‘rentier 
state mentality’ (Yates 1996: 203).
11. At the time, this was considered to be one of the largest 
independent infrastructure projects in the world.
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